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THE SUPREME COURT AS THE  
MAJOR BARRIER TO RACIAL EQUALITY 
Ivan E. Bodensteiner* 
This Article suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court, through its 
decisions in cases alleging race discrimination, stands as a major 
barrier to racial equality in the United States. There are several 
aspects of its decisions that lead to this result. Between 1868 and 
1954, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
while it had been interpreted to strike down a few blatant forms of 
de jure discrimination, allowed government to separate the races 
based on the “separate but equal” fiction. Beginning in 1954, Brown 
and a series of subsequent decisions attacked this fiction, and for a 
period of nearly twenty years, the Court was intent on eliminating 
the vestiges of segregation in the schools, approving broad remedial 
orders. This changed drastically beginning in 1974 when the Court 
began limiting the available remedies and relieving school systems 
of the burdens imposed by court orders. Around the same time, the 
Court decided that equal protection plaintiffs needed to show a 
discriminatory governmental purpose in order to trigger meaningful 
constitutional protection. This meant that facially neutral laws and 
practices with discriminatory effects were largely constitutional. 
Beginning with Bakke in 1978, the Court made it difficult, and 
eventually nearly impossible, for government to take affirmative 
steps designed to promote equality. A majority of the Court 
determined that invidious and benign racial classifications should 
be treated the same under the Equal Protection Clause, with both 
subjected to strict scrutiny. This completed the Court’s 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in a manner that 
makes it a real barrier to racial equality: government is free to 
engage in invidious discrimination as long as it masks the real 
purpose, and affirmative steps designed by government to promote 
equality will be struck down as a violation of equal protection. 
Ironically, the constitutional amendment designed to promote 
freedom and equality for the newly-freed slaves now stands in the 
way of true freedom and equality. 
 
*    Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. 
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
After the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery in 1865, it 
became apparent that the abolition of slavery as an institution would 
not assure freedom and equality. This recognition led to the adoption 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
1868, prohibiting states from “deny[ing] to any person within [their] 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”1 At a minimum, this 
clause was designed to address the inequality encountered by the 
newly-freed slaves. It was an early acknowledgement that merely 
eliminating legal approval and recognition of discrimination, in the 
form of slavery, would not lead to equality. Today, 140 years after 
adoption of the Equal Protection Clause and the passage of several 
federal antidiscrimination statutes, we remain in essentially the 
same position—racial minorities do not enjoy equality in the United 
States. 
My goal is not to demonstrate the absence of racial equality in 
some of the most important aspects of our lives, such as health care, 
education, housing, employment, political influence, and access to 
resources. Rather, I assume inequality exists and attempt to identify 
the single most responsible branch of government. Much to my 
dismay, I conclude the U.S. Supreme Court, sitting at the top of our 
system of justice, is most culpable. In this period of 140 years, there 
is a very short period of time, roughly between 1954 and 1973,2 
during which the Court demonstrated a willingness to use the Fifth3 
and Fourteenth Amendments to promote racial equality. This is not 
to suggest that the executive and legislative branches have promoted 
racial equality consistently since 1868. While the record of these 
branches is not stellar, I believe it is better than that of the Court, 
even though the efforts of these two branches have been stymied 
frequently by the Court. 
Part II of this Article briefly explores the context and purpose of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In Part III, I examine (a) some of the 
key Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Equal Protection 
Clause before Brown; (b) the promise of Brown; (c) the Court’s 
rejection of Brown beginning in 1974; and (d) the Court’s decisions 
limiting the ability of the other branches to promote racial equality 
through legislation, by interpreting Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 2.  This coincides, roughly, with the period of the Warren Court.  Of course, there 
are a few exceptions, such as Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), in which the 
Court held an invidious racial classification unconstitutional. 
 3.  Although the Fifth Amendment does not contain an equal protection clause, in 
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Court held that the right to equal 
protection of the laws can be enforced against the federal government through the due 
process provision in the Fifth Amendment. 
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Amendment narrowly and by applying the most rigid standard of 
review to affirmative steps taken by the other branches to promote 
equality. Part IV notes the irony of the Court’s use of the Equal 
Protection Clause to promote, or at least tolerate, race 
discrimination. 
II.    PURPOSE OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
The Fourteenth Amendment states that “[n]o State shall . . . 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”4 Five years after the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the 
Court, in the Slaughterhouse Cases,5 stated: “notwithstanding the 
formal recognition by those States of the abolition of slavery, the 
condition of the slave race would, without further protection of the 
Federal government, be almost as bad as it was before.”6 In short, 
abolishment of slavery in 1865, by passage of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, made the former slaves legally free, but did nothing to 
assure equality. More specifically, in addressing the Equal Protection 
Clause, the Court said  
[i]n light of the history of these amendments, and the pervading 
purpose of them . . . it is not difficult to give a meaning to this 
clause. The existence of laws in the States where the newly 
emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with gross 
injustice and hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be 
remedied by this clause, and by it such laws are forbidden.”7 
Because of this narrow focus on racial inequality, the Court 
predicted that the Equal Protection Clause would address only race 
discrimination.8 This prediction, of course, was not accurate as the 
Court has, for example, held that the Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits sex discrimination unless the classification satisfies 
intermediate scrutiny.9 
A few years after its decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases, in 
Strauder v. West Virginia,10 the Court struck down a state statute 
excluding blacks from jury service and said the Fourteenth 
Amendment was “one of a series of constitutional provisions having a 
common purpose; namely, securing to a race recently emancipated, a 
 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 5.  83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
 6.  Id. at 70. 
 7.  Id. at 81. 
 8. Id. (“We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of 
discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be 
held to come within the purview of this provision.”). 
 9.  See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190 (1976). 
 10.  100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
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race that through many generations had been held in slavery, all the 
civil rights that the superior race enjoy.”11 Further, it said the 
Fourteenth Amendment “was designed to assure to the colored race 
the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under law are enjoyed by 
white persons, and to give to that race the protection of the general 
government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the 
States.”12 Four years later, in Pace v. State,13 the Court said the 
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause “was to prevent hostile and 
discriminating state legislation against any person or class of 
persons,”14 but upheld an Alabama law that provided a harsher 
punishment for adultery between a Negro and a white person than 
adultery between persons of the same race.15 The same year, in The 
Civil Rights Cases,16 the Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of 
1875, on the grounds that it exceeded the power of Congress under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because it regulated private 
conduct, but described the Fourteenth Amendment as extending “its 
protection to races and classes, and prohibit[ing] any state legislation 
which has the effect of denying to any race or class, or to any 
individual, the equal protection of the laws.”17 In Plessy v. 
Ferguson,18 the Court upheld public transportation facilities 
separated by race, saying that while the  
object of the [fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce 
the absolute equality of the two races before the law, . . . in the 
nature of things, it could not have been intended to abolish 
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished 
from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon 
terms unsatisfactory to either.19 
In Brown v. Board of Education,20 before the Court rejected 
Plessy and held that “[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal,”21 it scheduled reargument that was: 
largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively 
 
 11.  Id. at 306. In this context, the Court stated that the “recently emancipated” 
race “especially needed protection against unfriendly action in the States where they 
were resident,” id. (emphasis added), suggesting the Equal Protection Clause was not 
aimed at friendly action, such as affirmative steps to assure equality. See id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  106 U.S. 583 (1883). 
 14. Id. at 584. 
 15. Id. at 585. 
 16.  109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 17.  Id. at 24 (emphasis added). 
 18.  163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 19.  Id. at 544. 
 20.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 21. Id. at 495. 
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consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the 
states, then existing practices in racial segregation, and the views 
of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion 
and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources 
cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which 
we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive.22 
Because of the status of public education in 1868, the Court noted it 
was not surprising that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provided little guidance “relating to its intended effect on public 
education.”23   
The first clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
designed to overrule the Dred Scott v. Sandford24 decision. Beyond 
that, the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to supplement the 
Thirteenth Amendment, at least with respect to the former slaves, 
because the framers recognized that legal status alone does not lead 
to equality. Similarly, the current status of racial minorities in the 
United States makes it apparent that neither a constitutional 
provision nor statutes prohibiting intentional race discrimination 
lead to equality. As with most provisions of the Constitution, 
reasonable people can disagree about the appropriate interpretation 
of the Equal Protection Clause. But the early decisions of the Court 
referred to above, while generally not favorable to the parties 
alleging race discrimination, suggest that they were (a) designed to 
supplement the Thirteenth Amendment in that the abolition of 
slavery did not assure freedom and equality;25 (b) aimed at the 
facially discriminatory laws that existed in many states and stood in 
the way of “absolute equality;”26 and (c) aimed at prohibiting state 
laws that have the effect of denying equal protection of the laws.27 
Most importantly, there is nothing in either the history of the Equal 
Protection Clause or the generally unfavorable pre-Brown decisions 
that precludes an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that 
would promote actual equality, instead of only formal equality. 
 
 22.  Id. at 489. 
 23.  Id. at 490. 
 24. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 25.  Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1873).  
 26.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896). 
 27.  The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883). 
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III.   SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INTERPRETING THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE 
A. Pre-Brown Decisions 
Shortly after adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, in 
Strauder v. West Virginia,28 the Court held that a West Virginia law 
limiting jury service to “white male persons who are twenty-one 
years of age and who are citizens of this State,” violated the Equal 
Protection Clause and was, therefore, unconstitutional.29 Despite the 
decision in Strauder, the Equal Protection Clause did not get off to a 
good start in the Supreme Court. A few years after Strauder, in Pace 
v. Alabama,30 the Court interpreted the Equal Protection Clause 
narrowly, holding that an Alabama criminal statute, which provided 
a greater punishment for adultery between a Negro and a white 
person than adultery between persons of the same race, did not 
violate equal protection because there was no discrimination against 
either race.31 The same year, in The Civil Rights Cases, the Court 
limited the power of Congress, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, holding Congress could not pass a law prohibiting race 
discrimination in the operation of privately-owned public 
accommodations because the Equal Protection Clause limits only 
state laws and acts committed under state authority.32 Justice 
Harlan wrote a lengthy dissent, arguing that those who operate 
public accommodations are “agents of the state,” and thus subject to 
regulation by Congress when they engage in race discrimination.33   
In 1896, the Court determined, in Plessy v. Ferguson, that “equal 
but separate” transportation accommodations for the white and 
“colored” races did not violate equal protection.34 Such laws, 
according to the Court, “do not necessarily imply the inferiority of 
either race to the other,” and the Court referred to the plaintiff’s 
assumption that the “enforced separation of the two races stamps the 
colored race with a badge of inferiority” as the “underlying fallacy” of 
his argument.35 Justice Harlan, in dissent, indicated everyone knows 
that the Louisiana statute “had its origin in the purpose, not so much 
to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to 
exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white 
 
 28. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
 29. Id. at 305. 
 30. 106 U.S. 583 (1883). 
 31. Id. at 585. 
 32.  109 U.S. at 23. 
 33.  Id. at 58 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 34.  163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896). 
 35.  Id. at 544, 551. 
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persons.”36 He accurately predicted that the judgment in Plessy “will, 
in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this 
tribunal in the Dred Scott case.”37 “Separate but equal” remained the 
law until Brown was decided in 1954, although in between Plessy and 
Brown, the Court found a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in 
a few cases where the educational opportunity was clearly not 
equal.38 
Ten years before Brown, there was yet another low point in the 
history of the United States Supreme Court when it concluded, in 
Korematsu v. United States,39 that the federal government’s 
placement of Japanese-Americans in concentration camps did not 
violate equal protection because it was justified by national security 
concerns.40 The Court reached this result even though it stated “that 
all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial 
group are immediately suspect” and are therefore subjected to “the 
most rigid scrutiny.”41 While he said the Court was utilizing “the 
most rigid scrutiny,” it is quite apparent that Justice Black, who 
delivered the opinion of the Court, was deferring to the judgment of 
the United States military.42 Justice Murphy wrote that he dissents 
“from this legalization of racism” and indicated that racial 
discrimination “is utterly revolting among a free people who have 
embraced the principles set forth in the Constitution of the United 
States.”43 
Even though a few challenges to racial classifications, based on 
the Equal Protection Clause, were successful before Brown, the Court 
had rendered the clause quite ineffective in addressing race 
discrimination. Race discrimination flourished under the “separate 
but equal” regime because the equal portion of the equation generally 
was not enforced by courts. There was no way to fit Korematsu into 
 
 36.  Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 37.  Id. at 559. 
 38.  See McLaurin v. Okla. St. Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 643 (1950) 
(ruling that after blacks were admitted to what had been an all-white school, the 
university could not segregate them in areas of the classrooms, libraries, and 
cafeterias). In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950), the University of Texas 
Law School denied admission to a black applicant because he could attend Prairie 
View Law School, a recently-created school for black students, but the Court held 
there was not substantial equality in the educational opportunities at the two schools. 
See also Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (holding that Missouri violated equal 
protection in denying admission to black students at its law school, but offering to pay 
for them to attend law school in other states). 
 39.  323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 40. Id. at 218-19. 
 41.  Id. at 216. 
 42. See id. at 223-24. 
 43.  Id. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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the “separate but equal” doctrine because, as in Strauder, there was 
no pretense of equality. Korematsu was like Strauder in that a 
particular race was singled out and disadvantaged, but the Court 
was unwilling to reach the same result it reached in Strauder. 
Instead, the Court pretended that “Korematsu was not excluded from 
the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race,” but rather 
“[he] was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese 
Empire.”44 Even when Brown arrived at the Supreme Court during 
its 1952-53 term, according to Justice Douglas, a majority of the 
Justices were ready to rule “that separate but equal schools were 
constitutional, that separate but unequal schools were not 
constitutional, and that the remedy was to give the states time to 
make the two systems of schools equal.”45  
B. Brown and Its Short-Lived Promise 
If we accept Justice Douglas’s bleak assessment of the situation, 
only the death of Chief Justice Vinson during the summer of 1953, 
and the appointment of Earl Warren as his replacement, led to the 
unanimous decision in Brown, holding that “in the field of public 
education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal.”46 Therefore, the 
segregation in the five school districts before the Court violated equal 
protection; and, after further argument, in 1955, the Court 
determined the appropriate remedy, which essentially deferred to the 
trial courts for the application of equitable principles and created the 
famous “all deliberate speed” standard of the Court.47   
Not surprisingly, the mere elimination of Jim Crow laws, such as 
laws providing for segregated schools, did not lead to equality. For a 
period of approximately fifteen years, it appeared the Court was 
serious about ending segregation in public education. In the early 
years after its decision in Brown, the Court was adamant about not 
only eliminating the laws providing for segregation in education but 
also eliminating the effects of that government-approved 
discrimination. In Cooper v. Aaron,48 the Court relied on Marbury in 
determining that its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
Brown is the supreme law of the land and binding upon the states.49 
Ten years after Brown, in Griffin v. County School Board,50 the Court 
found that it was unconstitutional for school systems to close rather 
 
 44.  Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223. 
 45.  WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975, at 113 (1980). 
 46.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 47.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
 48.  358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 49. Id. at 18-19. 
 50.  377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
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than desegregate, and assessed the resistance to Brown by stating 
“[t]here has been entirely too much deliberation and not enough 
speed in enforcing [Brown].”51 A few years later, in Green v. County 
School Board,52 the Court declared that school boards have “the 
affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to 
convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be 
eliminated root and branch,” and held that a “‘freedom-of-choice’ 
plan” violated equal protection.53 Three years later, in Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,54 the Court reiterated 
the goal of “eliminat[ing] from the public schools all vestiges of state-
imposed segregation,”55 in upholding a lower court order requiring 
racial balance, prohibiting one-race schools absent a strong showing 
by the school district that such schools were not the result of present 
or past discrimination, approving affirmative action in the form of 
altered attendance zones, and permitting busing as a means of 
desegregating.56 It was necessary for the Court to “defin[e] in more 
precise terms [than it had done before] the scope of the duty of school 
authorities and district courts in implementing” the decision in 
Brown.57 Swann clarified that broad remedial powers are available to 
the district courts, including busing and other affirmative steps 
designed to achieve racial balance in formerly segregated school 
systems.58 Finally, in Norwood v. Harrison,59 the Court held the 
Equal Protection Clause prohibited a state from subsidizing private 
schools that engaged in race discrimination in order to circumvent 
Brown.60 The Court stated, “[t]he existence of a permissible purpose 
cannot sustain an action that has an impermissible effect.”61 
 
 51.  Id. at 229. 
 52.  391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
 53.  Id. at 437-38. 
 54.  402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
 55.  Id. at 15. 
 56.  Id. at 22-31. 
 57.  Id. at 6. 
 58. Id at 22-31. 
 59.  413 U.S 455 (1973). Shortly before Norwood, the Court addressed segregation 
in the North in Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). Although the 
Denver school system was never segregated by mandate of state or local law, the Court 
held that “a finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful 
portion of a school system . . . creates a presumption that other segregated schooling 
within the system is not adventitious” and creates “a prima facie case of unlawful 
segregative design,” shifting the burden to the school system to prove “that other 
segregated schools within the system are not also the result of intentionally 
segregative actions.” Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208. Not surprisingly, Justice Rehnquist 
dissented. Id. at 254-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 60. See Norwood, 413 U.S. at 463-65. 
 61.  Id. at 466 (quoting Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972)) 
(emphasis added). While this decision was not explicitly overruled by Washington v. 
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Around this time the makeup of the Court was changing.62 These 
changes may help to explain a critical five-four decision in 1974, 
demonstrating that the Court quickly lost its interest in promoting 
equality.63 
C. The Rejection of Brown’s Promise during the Years Justice 
Rehnquist Served on the Court 
Although Justice Rehnquist did not replace Chief Justice Burger 
until 1986, the rejection of Brown seems to coincide with Justice 
Rehnquist’s time on the Court, beginning in 1972.64 Starting with 
Milliken v. Bradley,65 the Court significantly limited the district 
courts’ power to use an interdistrict remedy in attempting to address 
a single-district segregation problem.66 The Court stated: 
Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts 
may be set aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial 
purposes or by imposing a cross-district remedy, it must first be 
shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one 
district that produces a significant segregative effect in another 
district.  Specifically, it must be shown that racially discriminatory 
acts of the state or local school districts or of a single school district 
have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation.67 
Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by three other 
Justices, in which he noted that the decision in Milliken “cripples the 
ability of the judiciary to perform [its remedial] task,” and, as a 
result, “deliberate acts of segregation and their consequences will go 
unremedied, not because a remedy would be infeasible or 
unreasonable in terms of the usual criteria governing school 
desegregation cases, but because an effective remedy would cause 
what the Court considers to be undue administrative inconvenience 
to the State.”68 As a result, Justice White observed, the “State of 
Michigan, the entity at which the Fourteenth Amendment is 
directed, has successfully insulated itself from its duty to provide 
 
Davis, finding the “effect” impermissible is inconsistent with Davis. See infra notes 74-
76 and accompanying text. 
 62.  In 1969, Chief Justice Burger replaced Chief Justice Warren; in 1970, Justice 
Blackmun replaced Justice Fortas; in 1972, Justice Powell replaced Justice Black and 
Justice Rehnquist replaced Justice Harlan; in 1975, Justice Stevens replaced Justice 
Douglas; and in 1981, Justice O’Connor replaced Justice Stewart. PETER CHARLES 
HOFFER, ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT: AN ESSENTIAL HISTORY 369, 372-76 (Michael 
Briggs, ed., Univ. Press of Kansas 2007). 
 63. See infra note 65. 
 64. Id. at 408.  
 65.  418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 66. See id. at 744-45. 
 67.  Id.  
 68.  Id. at 762-63 (White, J., dissenting). 
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effective desegregation remedies by vesting sufficient power over its 
public schools in its local school districts.”69   
Thus, within a year after its decision in Norwood, the Court 
signaled it was not willing to use the Equal Protection Clause to 
abolish segregation when it placed substantial limits on the power of 
the courts to “impose a multidistrict, area wide remedy to a single-
district de jure segregation problem.”70 It did this even though it said, 
in Brown, that “the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place” in 
the “field of public education” and “[s]eparate educational facilities 
are inherently unequal.”71 When combined with its decision a year 
earlier, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,72 
the effect of Milliken was disastrous. Those who favor segregated 
schools had won the battle; Brown, while not overruled, had become 
fairly irrelevant. By the 1972-73 school year, over ninety-one percent 
of southern schools were desegregated; however, between 1988 and 
1998, most of the progress was lost.73 
Milliken was followed by a series of Supreme Court decisions 
that fatally wounded the Equal Protection Clause as an agent of 
racial equality. Shortly after Milliken, the Court delivered an 
important blow to the Equal Protection Clause in Davis,74 holding 
that “[t]he central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct 
discriminating on the basis of race” and that “disproportionate 
impact . . . alone . . . does not trigger the rule that racial 
classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are 
justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.”75 In short, 
Washington v. Davis requires that plaintiffs alleging racial 
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause prove 
intentional discrimination, that is, that the challenged action was 
taken “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects.”76 As 
 
 69.  Id. at 763. 
 70. Id. at 721 (majority opinion). 
 71.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).  
 72.  411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that significant disparities in school funding 
resulting from a wide difference in the tax base of school districts does not violate 
equal protection). 
 73.  See GARY ORFIELD, SCHOOLS MORE SEPARATE: CONSEQUENCES OF A DECADE OF 
RESEGREGATION 2 (2001), 
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/Schools_More_Separate.pdf. 
 74.  426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 75.  Id. at 239, 242 (citations omitted). Standing in contrast to the Davis holding, 
see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886), where the Court held that a law 
“fair on its face, and impartial in appearance” nevertheless violates equal protection “if 
it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal 
hand.” 
 76.  Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
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stated in Feeney, “‘[d]iscriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more than 
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.”77 
In the same year it decided Washington v. Davis, the Court 
decided Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler,78 in which 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, said “having once 
implemented a racially neutral attendance pattern in order to 
remedy the perceived constitutional violations on the part of the 
defendants, the District Court had fully performed its function of 
providing the appropriate remedy for previous racially 
discriminatory attendance patterns.”79 In other words, the federal 
courts were not to police the school districts to guard against 
resegregation. The Court made it clear that the Equal Protection 
Clause does not ban segregation nor assure actual equality in public 
education; rather, it bans only intentional discrimination, that is, 
segregation that is the result of intentional government action.80  
Thus, by 1976, only twenty-two years after Brown, it was 
apparent that the Fourteenth Amendment would tolerate a public 
education system that is “inherently unequal” by virtue of its 
segregated schools, so long as a challenger could not prove the 
segregation resulted from government action intended to achieve a 
segregated school system.81 When this is combined with the decision 
in Rodriguez,82 holding that a large disparity in per-pupil 
expenditures in different school districts within a state that opts for 
local control and funding does not violate the Equal Protection 
 
 77.  Id. (citation omitted). Justice Stevens concurred in both Davis and Feeney. In 
Davis, he observed “that the line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory 
impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of the 
Court’s opinion might assume.” 426 U.S. at 254 (Stevens, J., concurring). He states 
that not every disproportionate impact gives rise to a constitutional claim, but where 
“the disproportion is dramatic . . . it really does not matter whether the standard is 
phrased in terms of purpose or effect.” Id. The challenge to the test at issue was 
insufficient, according to Stevens, because the test served “a neutral and legitimate 
purpose of requiring all applicants to meet a minimum standard of literacy” and was 
“used throughout the federal service.” Id. at 254-55. Justice Stevens agreed with the 
outcome in Feeney because “the number of males disadvantaged by [the Massachusetts 
law] (1,867,000) is sufficiently large—and sufficiently close to the number of 
disadvantaged females (2,954,000)—to refute the claim that the rule was intended to 
benefit males as a class over females as a class.” 442 U.S. at 281 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
 78.  427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
 79.  Id. at 436-37. 
 80. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
 81.  Four Justices in Parents Involved in Community School v. Seattle School 
District No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007), repeated the distinction between de jure and de 
facto segregation, with the latter not having constitutional implications. Id. at 2761 
(plurality opinion). 
 82.  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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Clause,83 the Court’s license to the states to operate a public school 
system providing children with an education that is “inherently 
unequal” was granted in full.84 As a result, today we have states 
operating school systems in which the per-pupil expenditure varies 
widely, depending on the district’s property tax base, and in which 
many children attend schools that are predominantly one race.85 
Frequently, the school districts with the lowest per-pupil expenditure 
are those with the largest racial minority population.86 
Any doubt about the Court’s willingness to tolerate segregated 
schools was eliminated in Board of Education of Oklahoma City 
Public Schools v. Dowell,87 in which Justice Rehnquist, again writing 
for the Court, held that school districts were entitled to be relieved of 
burdensome court orders that displaced local authority at the point 
the school district can demonstrate that the “vestiges of past 
discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable.”88 In 
dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, 
expressed his belief that “a desegregation decree cannot be lifted so 
long as conditions likely to inflict the stigmatic injury condemned in 
Brown I persist and there remain feasible methods of eliminating 
such conditions.”89 
The dismantling of Brown continued the following year when the 
Court decided, in Freeman v. Pitts,90 that a school district could be 
 
 83. See supra note 72. 
 84. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 1234-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 85.  See, e.g., Diane Rado, Rich School, Poor School; Suburbs Facing a Great Divide 
Over Spending for Students, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 4, 2007, at C1 (showing that the 
wealthiest elementary district (10% low income students) in Lake County, near 
Chicago, spends $22,508 per student, while another school district (73% low-income 
students) in the same county spends $8,675 per student). In the Chicago public 
schools, where there were 336,793 African Americans under age eighteen, 265,857 
Hispanics under age eighteen, and 228,041 Caucasians under age eighteen, according 
to the 2000 Census. CHILDREN AND FAMILY RESEARCH CTR., CENSUS DATA: CHICAGO 
COMMUNITY (2000), http://xinia.social.uiuc.edu/outcomes/chidata.htm. In 2006, 264 
schools had 90% or more African-American students, 46 schools had 90% or more 
Hispanic students, and no schools had 90% or more Caucasian students. DEP’T OF 
APPLIED RES., CHI. PUB. SCH., RACIAL/ETHNIC SURVEY OF STUDENTS AS OF SEPT. 29, 
2006, at 1-43 (2006); see also Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2801-02 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“Between 1968 and 1980, the number of black children attending a school 
where minority children constituted more than half of the school fell from 77% to 63% 
in the Nation . . . but then reversed direction by the year 2000, rising from 63% to 72% 
in the Nation . . . . Today, more than one in six black children attend a school that is 
99-100% minority.”). 
 86.  See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 11-13. 
 87.  498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
 88.  Id. at 250. For a recent application of Dowell, see Anderson v. School Board of 
Madison County, 517 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 89.  Id. at 252 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 90.  503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
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relieved of the provisions of a court order part-by-part.91 In this case, 
the school district was entitled to be relieved of the portion of the 
order requiring desegregation in pupil assignment and in facilities, 
because those terms had been met, even though the school district 
had not complied with a provision relating to the assignment of 
teachers.92 Further, since the facilities portion of the order had been 
met, the district court could not review the discriminatory effects of 
the district’s plan to build a facility that would likely be of greater 
benefit to white students than black students.93 Finally, in Missouri 
v. Jenkins,94 the Court terminated a school desegregation order 
governing the Kansas City Schools, holding (i) that the district 
court’s attempt to attract nonminority students from outside the 
district was impermissible because there had been no showing of an 
interdistrict violation, (ii) the district court lacked authority to order 
an increase in teachers’ salaries, based on its belief that such an 
increase designed to attract teachers was essential for desegregation, 
and (iii) the continuing disparity in student test scores did not justify 
retaining the desegregation order because the Constitution requires 
only equal opportunity, not any particular result.95 Even though the 
1977 district court order was making a difference by reducing the 
number of black children enrolled in schools with a ninety percent or 
more black enrollment, the Court was willing to abandon the 
“project.”96 Eighteen years, 1977-1995, is a relatively short period in 
which to fix a school system that had been segregated by state 
statute, but the Court appeared unconcerned about the continuing 
disparity in student performance.  Interestingly, in the five cases, 
Milliken through Jenkins, Justice Rehnquist authored three of the 
opinions for the Court and joined the opinion of the Court in the 
other two cases. 
The significance of the decision in Davis, requiring that those 
alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause show a 
discriminatory purpose, cannot be overstated.97 While a 
discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the surrounding 
 
 91. See id. at 471. 
 92. See id. at 492. 
 93.  See id. at 492-99. 
 94.  515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
 95. Id. at 89-102. 
 96. Id. at 154 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 97.  While the Court is willing to require challengers in equal protection cases to 
show a discriminatory purpose, in other areas it has expressed a reluctance to inquire 
into the purpose of legislation. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) 
(“Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter.”); see also 
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1981) (plurality 
opinion) (explaining that the search for the actual or primary purpose of a statute “is 
likely to be elusive”). 
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circumstances, it is nevertheless difficult to prove when the racial 
classification does not appear on the face of the law, ordinance, or 
policy at issue. The effect of the decision in Washington v. Davis is 
clearly demonstrated in a sex discrimination case, Personnel 
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,98 where a Massachusetts 
statute provided a veterans’ preference for veterans who applied for 
state civil service positions.99 When the case was filed, over ninety-
eight percent of the veterans in Massachusetts were male and the 
district court referred to the absolute preference provided by the 
statute as having “a devastating impact upon the employment 
opportunities of women.”100 So, the discriminatory effect of the 
statute was obvious. However, the Court said the dispositive question 
“is whether the appellee has shown that a gender-based 
discriminatory purpose has, at least in some measure, shaped the 
Massachusetts veterans’ preference legislation.”101 Ms. Feeney’s 
“ultimate argument rest[ed] upon the presumption, common to the 
criminal and civil law, that a person intends the natural and 
foreseeable consequences of his voluntary actions.”102 After conceding 
that it would be “disingenuous to say that the adverse consequences 
of this legislation for women were unintended, in the sense that they 
were not volitional or in the sense that they were not foreseeable,”103 
the Court went on to explain that “discriminatory purpose,” for 
purposes of equal protection litigation, “implies more than intent as 
volition or intent as awareness of consequences.”104 Rather, the 
challenger must show that the decisionmaker “selected or reaffirmed 
a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely 
‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”105 
The “discriminatory purpose” approach to race discrimination is 
somewhat at odds with current cognitive psychology, suggesting that 
race discrimination is often unconscious and that “unconscious 
racism . . . underlies much of the racially disproportionate impact of 
governmental policy.”106 A social cognition approach to discrimination 
is based on three premises: first, stereotyping or categorization is a 
common cognitive mechanism used by most people “to simplify the 
task of perceiving, processing, and retaining information about 
 
 98.  442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
 99. Id. at 259. 
 100.  Id. at 260. 
 101.  Id. at 276. 
 102.  Id. at 278. 
 103. Id. 
 104.  Id. at 279. 
 105.  Id.  
 106.  Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 355 (1987). 
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people in memory;” second, stereotypes operate as “person 
prototypes” or “social schemas” that function as “implicit theories, 
biasing in predictable ways the perception, interpretation, encoding, 
retention, and recall of information about other people,” and these 
cognitive biases “operate absent intent to favor or disfavor members 
of a particular social group,” and “bias a decisionmaker’s judgment 
long before the ‘moment of decision;’” and third, these stereotypes, 
“when they function as implicit prototypes or schemas, operate 
beyond the reach of decisionmaker self-awareness,” making cognitive 
bias “both unintentional and unconscious.”107 These cognitive biases, 
because they operate automatically, “must be controlled, if at all, 
through subsequent ‘mental correction.’”108 As a result, “[t]o establish 
liability for . . . discrimination, a . . . plaintiff [should] simply be 
required to prove that his group status played a role in causing the 
employer’s action or decision.  Causation would no longer be equated 
with intentionality.”109 
Even if the Court is correct in requiring the challenger who 
asserts a claim based on the Equal Protection Clause to show intent, 
why does it define intent differently than it is defined in a well-
established body of, for example, tort law? A more appropriate way to 
determine the constitutionality of the Massachusetts statute would 
have been to find an intentional classification that disadvantaged 
female applicants, and then address whether the justification for the 
statute, that is, “to reward veterans for the sacrifice of military 
service, to ease the transition from military to civilian life, to 
encourage patriotic service, and to attract loyal and well-disciplined 
people to civil service occupations,”110 met the intermediate standard 
of review for sex discrimination. 
As described by the Court in Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,111 Washington v. Davis 
“made it clear that official action will not be held unconstitutional 
solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact,” which, 
although not irrelevant, alone will not establish racially 
discriminatory intent or purpose.112 The Court in Arlington Heights 
recognized that the challenger does not have “to prove that the 
challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes,” 
but rather, that “a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating 
 
 107.  Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
1161, 1187-88 (1995). 
 108.  Id. at 1216 (citation omitted). 
 109.  Id. at 1242 (emphasis added). 
 110.  Feeney, 442 U.S. at 265. 
 111.  429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 112.  Id. at 264-65. 
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factor in the decision.”113 It went on to describe how the challenger 
can attempt to prove this, through a showing of (a) a disproportionate 
impact, which in some cases may establish such a clear pattern that 
is “unexplainable on grounds other than race,” (b) the historical 
background of the challenged decision, including the sequence of 
events leading to the decision, departures from the normal 
procedural sequence and substantive departures, and (c) the 
legislative or administrative history, particularly where there are 
contemporary statements are made by members of the body in the 
course of rendering the challenged decision.114 
Later, in Hunter v. Underwood,115 the Court indicated that if the 
race discrimination plaintiff shows race was a substantial or 
motivating factor behind the law or decision that is challenged, the 
burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that the law would 
have been enacted without considering this factor.116 In Hunter, a 
law that denied the right to vote to anyone who had been convicted of 
a crime involving “moral turpitude” had a substantial discriminatory 
impact against black residents of Alabama.117 The Court agreed that 
race discrimination was a key purpose behind the legislation when it 
was adopted in 1901 and the government failed in its burden of 
demonstrating that the law would have been enacted without this 
consideration.118 
So, three key decisions of the Supreme Court—Rodriguez (1973), 
Milliken (1974), and Davis (1976)119—established the legal 
framework that allows today’s situation in public education. 
Rodriguez allows states to avoid responsibility for inequality in 
resources by establishing independent local school districts, with 
 
 113.  Id. at 265-66. 
 114.  Id. at 266-68.  Compare City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66-68 (1980) (no 
showing of a discriminatory purpose in establishing or maintaining an at-large system 
of electing the three members of a City Commission), with Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 
613, 622 (1982) (holding that an at-large system of electing members of a County 
Commission was unconstitutional, based on the District Court’s finding that the 
system was “maintained for [the] invidious purpose” of diluting the voting strength of 
the black population). 
 115.  471 U.S. 222 (1985). 
 116. Id. at 228. 
 117. Id. at 227. 
 118.  Id. at 231-33. 
 119.  The Court deciding Rodriguez and Milliken consisted of Justices Burger, 
Stewart, Powell, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall; the 
latter four Justices dissented in each of the two cases. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 
U.S. 717 (1974); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The 
Davis Court was the same, except Justice Stevens had replaced Justice Douglas, and 
only two Justices, Brennan and Marshall, dissented. See Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229 (1976). 
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property taxes as the primary source of funds.120 Similarly, Milliken 
excuses states from responsibility to avoid segregation by 
establishing independent local school districts and allowing parental 
choice of residence to preclude court-ordered integration.121 Davis 
provides the excuse to ignore the discriminatory effects of facially 
neutral government actions and insulates such effects from 
challenges based on the Equal Protection Clause,122 unless the 
challenger can prove a discriminatory purpose, that is, the 
government “decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular 
course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ 
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”123 This means there is 
no equal protection problem where a state tolerates a predominantly 
white suburban school district, spending nearly $600 per pupil, while 
an adjoining predominantly minority urban school district spends 
around $350 per pupil.124 Further, the fact that the education 
provided in these two districts is “inherently unequal” does not offend 
the Constitution. 
Of course, the Court is not the sole cause of this tragic situation. 
There is plenty of blame to go around—the executive and legislative 
branches of government are partly responsible, and parents who 
select housing based, at least in part, on the type of education 
available play a role. But, the fact remains that the Court, through 
its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, has paved the way 
for the segregated educational systems operating in many states. Not 
only has the Court interpreted the clause narrowly when those 
seeking equality rely on it, it has interpreted the clause broadly to 
prohibit benign race-conscious decisions when those opposed to 
government making race-conscious decisions to achieve equality 
challenge such decisions. As stated by Justice Marshall in Bakke,  
[I]t must be remembered that, during most of the past 200 years, 
the Constitution as interpreted by this Court did not prohibit the 
most ingenious and pervasive forms of discrimination against the 
Negro. Now, when a State acts to remedy the effects of that legacy 
 
 120. 411 U.S. at 23-26. 
 121. See 418 U.S. at 741-49.  
 122. See 426 U.S. at 242-46.  
 123. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
 124.  In Rodriguez, a school district in the core-city of San Antonio, where 
approximately 90% of the students were Mexican-American and over 6% of the 
students were African-American, spent $356 per pupil, while another school district in 
San Antonio, where the student population was 18% Mexican-American and less than 
1% African-American, spent $594 per student. 411 U.S. at 11-13. The Court decided 
there was no violation of equal protection. Id. at 28-29. 
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of discrimination, I cannot believe that this same Constitution 
stands as a barrier.125 
The point is that many low-income children are not receiving an 
adequate education in our public school system, and without such an 
education at the elementary and secondary level, it is difficult to 
level the playing field in the future. When low-income children 
receive an inferior education, this means a disproportionate number 
of minority children are receiving an inferior education. 
Unfortunately, being left behind in elementary and secondary 
education often results in being left behind in higher education and 
in employment. Recognizing the adverse effects of an inadequate 
education leads some higher educational institutions to take 
affirmative steps designed to compensate for the failures of public 
education. When these affirmative steps are challenged, the Supreme 
Court is very willing to use the Equal Protection Clause to strike 
them down.126 The Court’s decisions are, therefore, not only 
responsible for the need for affirmative, remedial steps, but also 
responsible for making it very difficult for the executive and 
legislative branches to take remedial action. 
The Court has stood in the path of legislation aimed at 
promoting equality in three major ways. First, the Court has 
narrowed the scope of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
thereby limiting the power of Congress to pass legislation. This 
started with the 1997 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,127 holding 
that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeded the Section 5 
power of Congress because the “congruence and proportionality” 
between the injury to be addressed and the means utilized was 
lacking.128 Second, the Court has insisted on applying strict scrutiny 
when facing a challenge to affirmative steps taken by government in 
an effort to promote racial equality and, as a result, it has found most 
such efforts to violate the Equal Protection Clause.129 Third, the 
Rehnquist Court has narrowly interpreted civil rights statutes, 
including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to the point that 
Congress has responded with several “restoration” acts.130 Of course 
 
 125.  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387 (1978) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 126.  See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 
2738 (2007); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 127.  521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 128. Id. at 520. 
 129.  See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 130.  See, e.g., Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2 § 181, 123 
Stat. 5 (rejecting the Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 
U.S. 618 (2007), and clarifying that a discriminatory compensation decision or other 
practice that is unlawful under statutes prohibiting employment discrimination occurs 
each time compensation is paid pursuant to the discriminatory decision or practice); 
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the impact of the Court’s legal framework extends far beyond public 
education, promoting inequality in employment, contracting, 
housing, health care, and other aspects of society. 
All of this leads me to conclude that the U.S. Supreme Court, 
since the mid-1970s and continuing to the present, is the institution 
most responsible for racial inequality in this country. It is indeed a 
sad state of affairs when the nation’s “justice” system is the greatest 
cause of injustice. Even the Court recognizes that “compliance with 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on racial discrimination . . . 
bolsters the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system”131 and 
that “[r]ace discrimination is ‘especially pernicious in the 
administration of justice.’”132 There is, indeed, reason to question the 
legitimacy of our justice system. 
D. Blocking Political Branches’ Attempts to Promote Equality 
In a series of cases, beginning with Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke133 and culminating with Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,134 the Court has 
made it very difficult for federal, state, and local government to take 
benign race-conscious steps designed to promote racial equality.135 
Just as those who promoted the Fourteenth Amendment realized 
that making slavery illegal would not ensure freedom and equality, 
government officials across the country, as well as leaders of private 
institutions, understand that prohibiting race discrimination does 
not assure equality.136 The Court has continually blocked their 
efforts. 
When the so-called “affirmative action”137 cases came before the 
Court, starting with Bakke, a key issue concerned the appropriate 
standard of review. Recall that in the context of invidious race 
 
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3406, 122 Stat. 3553 (rejecting 
several Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Americans with Disability Act in a 
manner that narrowed the intended broad scope of the Act). 
 131.  Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510-11 (2005). 
 132.  Id. at 511 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)). 
 133.  438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 134.  127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
 135.  I do not include the Court’s decisions in voting cases addressing race-conscious 
districting. Generally, if race is used in drawing election districts, strict scrutiny 
applies even though no one is excluded from voting and every vote is counted equally. 
See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958-59 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 906-07 
(1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920-21 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 
643-45 (1993).   
 136. See generally Bakke, 438 U.S. at 364-73 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 137.  I try to avoid using this term because it has a pejorative connotation, 
suggesting quotas and other sorts of horrible actions designed to disfavor white 
persons. 
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discrimination, the Court, as early as Korematsu, indicated that legal 
restrictions on the rights of a single racial group were “immediately 
suspect” and subject to the “most rigid scrutiny.”138 Strict scrutiny 
requires the government to show that it has a compelling 
justification for the racial classification and that the means selected 
to accomplish its goal are the least restrictive or narrowly tailored.139 
When addressing invidious race discrimination, Korematsu remains 
the only case in which the Court found that government had met its 
burden.140 
In Bakke, four Justices argued that intermediate scrutiny should 
govern benign racial classifications, that is, those intended to benefit 
minorities.141 This position never gained the support of five Justices 
and, after skirting the issue in several cases, in Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co.,142 the Court held that strict scrutiny governs all racial 
classifications, both invidious and benign, when the classification 
was made by state or local government.143 A year later, in Metro 
Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,144 the 
Court held that race-conscious programs adopted by Congress would 
be subjected to intermediate scrutiny because Congress, as the 
“National Legislature,” was entitled to deference.145 However, five 
years later, that decision was overruled when the Court, in Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,146 held “that all racial classifications, 
imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, 
must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”147 This 
means that all benign race-conscious actions, designed to promote 
racial equality, will be subjected to strict scrutiny, a standard that is 
nearly always fatal. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens refers 
to the Court’s “disconcerting lecture about the evils of governmental 
racial classifications” and its assumption “that there is no significant 
difference between a decision by the majority to impose a special 
burden on the members of a minority race and a decision by the 
majority to provide a benefit to certain members of that minority 
notwithstanding its incidental burden on some members of the 
 
 138.  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
 139. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 140. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18. 
 141.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 358-62 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
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 146.  515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
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majority.”148 Justice Stevens states that the assumption of the 
majority is untenable because “[i]nvidious discrimination is an 
engine of oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to enhance or 
maintain the power of the majority. Remedial race-based preferences 
reflect the opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society.”149 
When applying strict scrutiny, a racial classification can fail 
either because the government has not established a compelling 
justification or because the government fails to show that the means 
selected is narrowly tailored. The first prong of this standard can be 
satisfied when government is attempting to remedy past 
discrimination by the entity that is taking the affirmative steps. So, 
for example, if a minority proves invidious race discrimination by a 
municipality in hiring, as part of the remedy, the court may order the 
municipality to take affirmative steps to remedy that past wrong. If a 
municipality wants to take affirmative steps voluntarily to address 
past discrimination, it must establish a prima facie case that it has 
discriminated in the past in the particular activity at issue, such as 
employment or contracting.150 Of course, most municipalities are 
reluctant to make a determination that they have engaged in 
invidious discrimination in the past. 
The theory of unconscious discrimination, or implicit bias,151 
informs the need for and utility of affirmative steps designed to 
promote equality. Such affirmative steps can be seen “as attempts by 
the state to correct for implicit bias, and thus, to break the 
connection between such bias and outcomes” and a “preference for 
 
 148.  Id. at 242-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 149.  Id. at 243. 
 150.  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 498-506. Compare Croson, id., 
with Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971), 
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finding of a constitutional violation, however, that would not be within the 
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In Parents Involved in Community School v. Seattle School District No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 
2738, 2752 n.10 (2007), the Court, as well as the plurality, id. at 2762, dismissed this 
portion of Swann as dicta.  
 151.  See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text. 
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those harmed by the biased assessments can help prevent the 
implicit bias from being translated into final outcomes.”152 Efforts to 
“debias” decisionmaking, both direct and indirect, can be enhanced 
by affirmative steps because “the presence of population diversity in 
an environment tends to reduce the level of implicit bias,”153 and 
affirmative steps can lead to increased diversity.154 Further, by 
tolerating plans or programs calling for affirmative steps designed to 
promote equality, “the law is engaging in a form of indirect 
debiasing; that is, regulated actors are permitted to take steps that, 
in turn, tend to reduce implicit bias.”155 Two other authors argue that 
a proper interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII 
would allow employers to engage in affirmative action in order to 
produce a diverse workforce and thereby reduce implicit bias.156 This 
empirical data supports a common sense notion that the most 
effective way to address the effects of discrimination in employment, 
for example, is to design a program that addresses the causes of 
unequal opportunity and, in fact, leads to more jobs for racial 
minorities. It is difficult to pretend we have eliminated race 
discrimination by simply passing laws making it illegal, but ignoring 
the fact that the results show little or no improvement in 
employment opportunities for racial minorities. 
In the context of education, a majority of the Court, in Grutter v. 
Bollinger,157 accepted diversity in an educational institution (a law 
school) as a compelling government interest.158 However, the decision 
is narrow and such programs must meet the narrowly tailored 
requirement.159 They cannot use a quota system, applicants must be 
evaluated individually, all factors that may contribute to student 
body diversity must be meaningfully considered along with race, the 
school must consider workable race-neutral alternatives, the race-
conscious admissions program must not unduly harm members of 
any racial group, and the program should be limited in time.160 
The continuing vitality of Grutter was placed in issue when the 
Court, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
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District No. 1,161 struck down the school districts’ use of race in 
assigning students to a particular school in order to assure “that the 
racial balance at the school falls within a predetermined range based 
on the racial composition of the school district as a whole.”162 The 
Seattle School District, the Court noted, had “never operated 
segregated schools, nor . . . ha[d] it been subjected to court-ordered 
desegregation,” but used “the racial tiebreaker in an attempt to 
address the effects of racially identifiable housing patterns on school 
assignments.”163 In contrast, the Jefferson County Public Schools, 
which operates the public school system in Louisville, Kentucky, had 
maintained a segregated school system until 1975 when the federal 
court entered a desegregation decree; however, this decree was 
dissolved in 2000 after a finding that it had achieved unitary 
status.164 A student assignment plan adopted in 2001 required that 
“all non magnet schools maintain a minimum black enrollment of 15 
percent and a maximum black enrollment of 50 percent,” in a system 
in which approximately 34 percent of the students are black.165 
Five Justices voted to strike down both the Seattle plan and the 
Louisville plan; however, to understand the meaning of the case, it is 
necessary to analyze carefully the plurality opinion of Justice 
Roberts166 and the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, who 
supplied the critical fifth vote. Justice Roberts, in a portion of his 
opinion joined by Justice Kennedy, suggests that diversity may be a 
compelling government interest only in higher education, because 
Grutter “relied upon considerations unique to institutions of higher 
education.”167 In a portion of his opinion not joined by Kennedy, 
Roberts referred to the design and operation of the challenged plans 
as “directed only to racial balance, pure and simple, an objective this 
Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate.”168 Later, he said 
“[r]acial balancing is not transformed from ‘patently unconstitutional’ 
to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it ‘racial 
diversity.’”169 Justice Kennedy joined the plurality in concluding that 
the school districts failed to show that their plans were narrowly 
tailored, particularly because they did not establish necessity and 
they did not show they considered methods other than explicit racial 
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classifications to achieve their stated goals.170 Finally, in a portion of 
his opinion not joined by Kennedy, Justice Roberts gave a narrow 
version of what Brown stands for, stating: 
Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could go and 
could not go to school based on the color of their skin. The school 
districts in these cases have not carried the heavy burden of 
demonstrating that we should allow this once again—even for very 
different reasons. For schools that never segregated on the basis of 
race, such as Seattle, or that have removed the vestiges of past 
segregation, such as Jefferson County, the way “to achieve a 
system of determining admission to the public schools on a 
nonracial basis,” is to stop assigning students on a racial basis. The 
way to stop discriminating on the basis of race is to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race.171 
Responding to this language, Justice Stevens, in his dissent, 
states: 
There is a cruel irony in the Chief Justice’s reliance on our decision 
in [Brown]. The first sentence in the concluding paragraph of his 
opinion states: “Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they 
could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin.” 
This sentence reminds me of Anatole France’s observation: “[T]he 
majestic equality of the la[w], forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep 
under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.” The 
Chief Justice fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren who 
were so ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of 
white children struggling to attend black schools. In this and other 
ways, the Chief Justice rewrites the history of one of this Court’s 
most important decisions.172 
Justice Stevens goes on to attack what he calls the Court’s “rigid 
adherence to tiers of scrutiny” because it “obscures Brown’s clear 
message.”173 
When it comes to affirmative steps voluntarily taken by school 
districts to avoid resegregation, it appears apparent that the 
plurality wants strict scrutiny to be fatal in practice. Justice Thomas, 
in his concurring opinion, refuses to recognize even the starkest 
racial imbalance as resegregation because the term segregation is 
reserved for de jure segregation.174 Justice Kennedy, while agreeing 
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that the plans were not narrowly tailored, sees it differently.175 He 
states that parts of the plurality opinion “imply an all-too-unyielding 
insistence that race cannot be a factor in instances when, in my view, 
it may be taken into account,” and that “[t]he plurality opinion is at 
least open to the interpretation that the Constitution requires school 
districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in 
schooling.”176 Further, “[t]o the extent the plurality opinion suggests 
the Constitution mandates that state and local school authorities 
must accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my 
view, profoundly mistaken.”177 He goes on to say school districts may 
“seek to reach Brown’s objective of equal educational opportunity,” 
and that “it is permissible to consider the racial makeup of schools 
and to adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body, 
one aspect of which is its racial composition.”178 Most importantly, 
Justice Kennedy said “[a] compelling interest exists in avoiding racial 
isolation, an interest that a school district, in its discretion and 
expertise, may choose to pursue. Likewise, a district may consider it 
a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population.”179 He 
concludes by encouraging school districts to continue “the important 
work of bringing together students of different racial, ethnic, and 
economic backgrounds.”180 
So, what does the decision in Parents Involved mean for the 
future? If the plurality view prevails, strict scrutiny will, in fact, be 
fatal, and states and school districts will simply have to accept 
resegregation that is not the direct result of government action. In 
contrast, if the four dissenting Justices prevail, affirmative steps to 
address the inequality inherent in segregation will be allowed. The 
key, of course, is Justice Kennedy and whether a school district can 
convince him that its plan is narrowly tailored.181 
The irony of the Court’s rigid adherence to strict scrutiny in all 
cases alleging race discrimination, both invidious and benign, is that 
such scrutiny is not necessary to strike down invidious 
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discrimination.182 As a result heightened scrutiny serves no purpose 
other than to strike down benign race-conscious actions designed to 
achieve racial equality. A racial classification, the purpose of which is 
to disadvantage a racial minority, violates equal protection even if a 
court applies a heightened version of rational basis. For example, in 
Romer v. Evans,183 the Court recognized “that if a law neither 
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will 
uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational 
relation to some legitimate end,”184 but went on to strike down a 
Colorado constitutional amendment that prohibited the passage of 
any law banning discrimination based on sexual orientation because 
there was no legitimate governmental purpose, that is “the 
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of 
persons affected.”185 The Court relied, in part, on its earlier decision 
in U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,186 where it stated that if 
“‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very 
least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental 
interest.”187 Based on the rationale of Romer and Moreno, invidious 
race discrimination would be struck down utilizing rational basis 
because such action is “born of animosity.”188 
In contrast, affirmative government actions designed to promote 
racial equality have a legitimate governmental purpose—racial 
equality and equal opportunity—and the means utilized are 
rationally related to that purpose. In short, strict scrutiny is not 
needed to strike down invidious discrimination based on the Equal 
Protection Clause, but strict scrutiny serves to prohibit nearly all 
voluntary race-conscious steps taken by government in an effort to 
achieve racial equality. It is difficult to believe that this was the 
intent or goal of those who fought for the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
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IV.    THE SUPREME COURT AS THE PROBLEM 
The net effect of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence is 
that the Equal Protection Clause has become a huge barrier to 
achieving racial equality. It appears that the Court’s message to 
government is that it is free to engage in invidious race 
discrimination so long as it is able to mask the discrimination. In 
other words, do not make the racial classification explicit and find 
proxies for your discriminatory purposes. Racial discrimination may 
flourish so long as it is disguised in a manner that makes it difficult 
for any challenger to establish the real purpose of facially neutral 
policies and practices. Similarly, benign efforts to promote equality 
that take race into account are more likely to survive if government 
is not transparent, that is, government attempts to mask its race-
conscious decisions. Can this result possibly be consistent with the 
Equal Protection Clause? Is it possible that the clause has nothing to 
do with actual equality? Why did the Court choose this path? 
To address the last question posed above, it is necessary to 
examine the “top three” decisions that have led to the current status 
of the law.189 Starting with Milliken, the decision that severely 
limited the power of the courts to address segregation in elementary 
and secondary education by restricting the use of an interdistrict 
remedy,190 we should examine what was at stake in the case, that is, 
the ability of whites to flee from integrated schools. It was easy for 
parents to flee from Detroit and move a few miles to a nearby, 
mostly-white, school district.191 This was a less costly alternative to 
sending their children to a private, mostly-white, school.192 The Court 
was unwilling to take this “right to flee” from parents, so it ignored 
the fact that Michigan, like most states, had made a conscious 
decision to vest control over its public schools in local school 
districts.193 Even if fleeing is private action, not subject to the 
restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment, certainly the organization 
and governance of the public schools is state action. In Norwood, the 
Court recognized what Mississippi was doing—assisting white 
parents who wanted to flee from public schools that were ordered to 
desegregate by subsidizing the mostly-white private schools—and 
 
 189.  I am referring to Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 
(1989). A fourth decision, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), 
made the evil of Croson, the use of strict scrutiny when a benign racial classification is 
challenged, more comprehensive in that it applied strict scrutiny to benign 
classifications made by Congress.  
 190. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745.  
 191. See id. at 804-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 192. See id. at 801-02. 
 193.  See id. at 763 (White, J., dissenting). 
 2009] BARRIER TO RACIAL EQUALITY 227 
found a violation of the Equal Protection Clause because of the 
impermissible effect of the state’s action.194   
Why was Mississippi’s action struck down while Michigan’s was 
upheld? Of course there are factual differences, for example, 
Mississippi’s goal was more obvious and Michigan’s explanation 
(local control of public schools) was more legitimate, but are there 
real differences? In both states, the effect was impermissible in that 
it facilitated the private action of white parents who wanted to 
interfere with Brown’s mandate to desegregate public schools. In 
short, Milliken allowed states to facilitate the efforts of white parents 
who were intent upon avoiding the Court’s mandate to integrate 
public schools. This looks a bit like what the Court would not allow in 
Shelley v. Kramer,195 when the Court reversed the decision of a state 
court in Missouri that was very willing to assist white parents who 
sought the assistance of government in carrying out a racially 
restrictive covenant.196 While Michigan could not have prevented its 
residents from leaving the state to avoid integration, it certainly did 
not have to facilitate their efforts by ceding control of its schools to 
local districts and boards.197 
Following closely on the heels of Milliken, the Court in Davis 
made explicit what was implicit in Milliken, that is, discriminatory 
effects alone, without a discriminatory purpose, do not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause.198 This decision was instrumental in 
gutting the Equal Protection Clause because the Court made it clear 
that the clause did not assure actual equality.199 Davis paved the way 
for the Court’s retreat from Brown in public education by making it 
clear that neither segregation nor resegregation violates the Equal 
Protection Clause so long as the challengers cannot prove it is the 
result of government action.200 As made clear in a subsequent 
decision, government is now free to ignore the obvious discriminatory 
effects of its action so long as it masks any discriminatory purpose.201 
What was really at stake in Davis, beyond the employment test 
utilized by the District of Columbia? This decision goes to the guts of 
the Equal Protection Clause in that it relieved government of any 
constitutional obligation to promote equality by monitoring the 
effects of its actions. As stated earlier, in a more sinister way, Davis 
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legalized government activity designed to maintain inequality so long 
as its purpose could not be unmasked. In other words, the Equal 
Protection Clause does not guarantee actual equality, only formal (de 
jure) equality. There is nothing in the language of the Equal 
Protection Clause that mandates the result in Davis, nor is Justice 
White’s opinion for the Court compelling. Justice White refers to a 
number of prior decisions to support his conclusion that “our cases 
have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, 
without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory 
purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially 
disproportionate impact.”202 He concedes “[t]here are some 
indications to the contrary in our cases.”203 My point is simply that 
there is nothing in either the language of the Equal Protection 
Clause or the Court’s prior decisions that dictated the result in 
Davis. 
Even if one is convinced that the purpose of the clause was to 
reach only intentional discrimination, the Court could have reached a 
different result by simply applying the well-established 
understanding of intent in tort law—“intent as volition or intent as 
awareness of consequences.”204 Alternatively, the Court could have 
utilized the approach developed in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,205 for 
cases alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII.206 
Very briefly, under Griggs, the plaintiff can establish a prima facie 
case by showing that a facially neutral practice has a significant 
disproportionate impact, thus shifting the burden of persuasion to 
the employer to show that the practice has a manifest relationship to 
the job at issue.207 This is similar to the scheme employed in an equal 
protection case, Castaneda v. Partida,208 where the Court held that a 
stark statistical disparity showing a substantial underrepresentation 
of Mexican-Americans selected for grand jury duty establishes a 
prima facie case209 and shifts “the burden of proof to the State to 
dispel the inference of intentional discrimination.”210 So, in light of 
the credible alternatives to its holding in Davis, how can we explain 
the decision in Davis? Maybe the Court was simply unwilling to 
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promote true equality by forcing government to prepare a 
“discriminatory effects impact statement” before it takes action. As 
suggested by Justice Stevens in his concurring opinions in Davis and 
Feeney,211 the Court could have ruled in favor of the government in 
these two cases without gutting the Equal Protection Clause. 
One more step and the Court’s mission was complete—to avoid 
racial equality, it needed to subject affirmative government steps 
designed to promote equality to strict scrutiny. After several years of 
litigation, the Court accomplished this in Croson and Adarand. In an 
effort to disguise what it is really doing in these cases, several 
Justices insist that race-conscious actions will only perpetuate race 
discrimination. For example, in his plurality opinion in Parents 
Involved, Chief Justice Roberts states, without any supporting 
empirical data, that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of 
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”212 In the same 
case, Justice Thomas refuses to view racial imbalance as 
segregation213 and argues that there is really no difference between 
invidious and benign discrimination.214 Is there really no difference 
between an action taken for the purpose of promoting equality and 
an action taken for the purpose of hurting a particular race? Isn’t the 
latter action “born of animosity,” while the former action is well-
intentioned? Even if it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between 
the two,215 in most circumstances, it will not be difficult and the trier 
of fact should be up to the task.216 
Assuming that all three of these “top three” decisions raise 
difficult issues, that reasonable people could differ, and that there is 
some support for the Court’s decisions, these assumptions do not 
provide an explanation for why the Court selected the path it did 
rather than the path that would have promoted racial equality. 
Given the nature of constitutional interpretation, which leaves some 
slack in joints of the various provisions, it is quite apparent that the 
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Court, beginning in the mid-1970s, deliberately selected the path 
that perpetuates and even promotes racial inequality. When a 
perfectly legitimate, reasonable, and justifiable alternative existed, 
the Court’s choice is unjustified. 
V.    CONCLUSION 
Contrary to Alexander Bickel’s description of the Court,217 in the 
area of racial equality, it is indeed the “most dangerous branch” 
because, with the exception of a short period between 1954 and 1973, 
it has consistently interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment in a 
manner that prevents it, and the other branches of the federal 
government as well as state and local government, from promoting 
racial equality. While the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished 
slavery as a matter of law, the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which serves to strike down most de jure 
discrimination, and several federal statutes that address 
discrimination by both government and private parties in certain 
activities have resulted in substantial progress in our society, they 
have not resulted in any semblance of racial equality. A major 
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